Lean thinking in the aerospace industry (again)
Words: Jim Womack, founder and senior advisor of the Lean Enterprise Institute
When I began studying the automotive industry at MIT in the early 1980s, my choice of that sector was an accident. It was Toyota and its business system that I wanted to understand. If the company had made airplanes, I would very happily have studied the aerospace industry. In fact, I would have been much happier. I have always found the aerospace industry more fun than the automotive industry.
Indeed, Toyota did make an airplane: a prototype of a design – the TAA-1. It was developed during the 1990s (and flew briefly in 2002) for reasons never well explained, but I imagine more for the pleasure of Toyota's senior executives, who had always wanted to be aerospace engineers. And Honda has just begun deliveries of the twin-engine HondaJet HA-420, developed – I suspect – for the same reasons.
So car makers can make airplanes – Henry Ford above all with the Ford Trimotor (1925), the one-person Flying Flivver (1926), and 8,800 B-24s produced under contract during World War II using many lean techniques. But, throughout history, the automotive industry has made airplanes only sporadically, without full effort, and with limited commercial success. I knew when "The Machine That Changed the World" was published in 1990 that, if I wanted to be completely happy, combining lean and the aerospace industry, I would need to take what I had learned from Toyota and find ways to apply it in the aerospace industry.
Soon, I found a way to do this. In the early 1990s, when Dan Jones and I began writing "Lean Thinking", we found a great example of lean transformation at Pratt & Whitney, the jet engine company. At first, it was hard to believe that any industry called "space age" could be so slow at doing everything – design, flight testing, production, maintenance. So we naturally asked ourselves whether there was any reason lean concepts could not be applied. Fortunately, as we watched Pratt's Japanese sensei conducting experiments to introduce lean techniques, it became clear that there was extraordinary potential for creating high-speed flow in low-volume, high-variability value streams in commercial and military aviation and in satellites.
(An illuminating example of the opportunity: my main lean transformation project as a traditional consultant – just before the founding of the Lean Enterprise Institute – was in 1995-97 at Boeing commercial aircraft. There, my colleague, Dave Fitzpatrick, calculated the speed of a snail in his garden and compared it with the average speed of an aluminum ingot as it traveled from the smelter at Alcoa, in Tennessee, to flying on a Boeing 747 two years later in Washington State. The snail was much faster!).
So I had a lot of fun watching the creation of high speed first within Boeing's walls (for example, the moving assembly line for the 737) and then in the operations of other aerospace companies, including Lockheed Martin and United Technologies. But the speed of change seemed to slow steadily as the scope of these activities expanded. And the critical task of reconfiguring and making entire value streams lean across OEMs and supplier companies (as I had proposed at Boeing) seemed impossible. Gradually, the leading companies chose massive staff-driven operational excellence programs, such as ACE at United Technologies and LM21 at Lockheed Martin. The intention was great, but, according to my observations, they focused on individual points instead of optimizing the whole and had a low probability of creating sustainable change.
But then Dan and I had another idea while working on the book "Lean Solutions" (2005). We decided that the most exciting transformations in the aerospace industry were at the operational level, working backward from customer needs instead of starting in manufacturing or engineering. So we studied startup concepts using small, 35-passenger jets with direct flights and high-frequency schedules and service instead of hubs, where connections are made. We also examined proposals for shared use of very small jets (four passengers), such as the Eclipse in air taxi services, with dynamic scheduling. And we talked with user-satellite-user services for our telecommunications, such as Iridium. The idea in all cases was to use less equipment in higher volumes and leave out many of the steps and costs of traditional service delivery: huge terminals, even bigger airport hubs, and enormous numbers of cell towers. This carried the hope of drastically reducing flight times and costs for travelers, as well as the costs and access limitations for telecommunications users in low-density areas.
But nothing more happened: the passenger startups failed, and the big "legacy" carriers consolidated to gain pricing power and embraced the traveler-hostile concept of connections, which minimizes equipment utilization at the expense of travel time and passenger comfort. The "low-cost carriers", such as Southwest and Ryanair, standardized on the use of conventional 150-passenger jets using larger airports, leaving out most of the small-city-to-small-city flights that would save time and money. And Iridium and Eclipse failed to scale down their systems and went bankrupt (Iridium came back a few years later as a successful business, but with a much smaller number of users than originally planned). Meanwhile, the government space industry strongly supported multi-decade lead-times for design and multi-year lead-times for the production of large rockets and satellites, increasing rather than decreasing unit costs.
There were some sustainable successes, such as Embraer in Brazil, and engine and airframe overhaul in military departments and at some airlines. But I was almost ready to give up on the idea of lean in the aerospace industry when something unexpected happened. Outsiders – Jeff Bezos (of Blue Origin and a maker of delivery drones), Richard Branson (of Virgin Galactic), Elon Musk (of SpaceX), and Gregg Wyler (of OneWeb) – showed up with a new idea.
Air and space are now places for many cheap, high-volume things – satellites, launchers, spaceplanes, drones – to be designed and built using the mundane methods of the… high-volume automotive industry (and of the electronics industry as well).
For example, OneWeb is creating a large constellation of small, cheap communications satellites linking billions of users through millions of cheap, mass-produced ground receivers, with the goal of bringing affordable internet and web access to the 4 billion people on the planet who are not connected. Its new satellite factory in Florida to manufacture the necessary equipment was announced last week.
In this new vision, the era is passing of massive, bespoke projects for satellites, launchers, spaceplanes (such as the space shuttle), etc., produced in what amount to craft workshops (no matter how large) by high-tech artisans at practically zero speed. And, suddenly, I began receiving calls about how lean thinking can be applied in this new vision of the aerospace industry.
We will soon see whether our ideas can now be accepted, although my initial discussions with some firms, such as those listed, have been disappointing. There is still a big disconnect between our way of thinking and theirs: "you mean we have to stick to a schedule and that every step of design, production, and operations needs to be stable and repeatable?!", "you mean it is better to design our manufacturing and test steps instead of automating them?", and "what is this A3 method for analyzing problems and opportunities? Let's just do something now!".
These startups now need to leap from the craft methods with traditional, entrepreneurial management that they have applied during the proof-of-concept phase to lean production with lean management during production in order to reduce costs and lead-times. I am aware that the default for these startups is mass production with modern management, but, in that case, many (or all?) will fail, and many opportunities will be wasted.
I still think there is a great opportunity for lean thinking in this new era of the aerospace industry, and I hope the lean community will engage deeply. I also hope we can all have fun for a change, engaging in greenfield activities where the sky is the limit instead of brownfield activities repairing the mistakes of the past.